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INTRODUCT 101.
In dealing with the subject of Trade Jlarks,one is inad-
vertently struck with its enormit . ,. It is among the most im-
portant branches of our jurisprudence; one that is usually
overlooked by the ordinary student of the law,when preparing
to meet the vexatious questions which will invariably be his
lot. The Trade Mark law does not seek for foreign objects or
special designs on which to bestow its favors,but into the
every day business relations of life can be found the conflicts
and petty quarrelswhich trade marRh law endeavors to settle
without injustice. One apparent reason for its isolated condi-
tion is the growing tendency among attorneys,to pick out
some branch of the law and devote their entire energies and
business thereto. Such is the case with Patent Law,Real Estate
Law,Criminal Law, and many other branches & among them the
subject of this article. But the law is not so intricate that
it needs an enormous brain to comprehend or the life work of
a person to carry out. It has its peculiarities as has most
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legal subjects and it requires the great need of a close and
definite distinction by a court in settling all controversies.
The decision of a court in trade mark cases,as a general
rule,is based largely on their own tiscretion whether a trade
mark claimed to be assimilated,is so close a resemblance as
to mislead the public. This is the one great rule which m~ust
enter into all decisions. In treating the subject of Infring-
ments it will become necessary as a preface to devote a little
time to trade marks. While an elaborate discussion would be
out of place hereit would be almost imfpossible to present
more than a vague idea of the subject.
Infringements of Trade Marks.
A trade markor its characteristic,is not a production
of the modern people; it is indeed very ancient in its usages.
For we read of the brand of a manufacturer's name accompanied
by some emblem,stamped on the different classes of pottery,
of which the Chinese were the first producers,as far back as
Two Thousand six hundred and ninety eight B.C. These manu-
facturers had no idea of confiscating that one mark for them-
selves alonebut used different ones at different tihes,and
other people were free to use the same mark as a distinction
of their particular class of goods. The people of Rome,Greece,
and EgypIt,used a mark of a large picture or drawingfor the
purpose of showing to the ignorant class,their goods in con-
tradistinction to those of another manufacturer or vendor. We
read of their using large signboards covered with glaring
pictures of hideous beasts,largely or wholly the product of
their owm imagination,for the purpose of attracting the atten-
tion of the people to their class of goods.
A seal has by some authors been said to have obtained
its origin in these old custom~more part icularly that of the
30
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aristocratic body who strive to make their name perpetual
by keeping it constantly before the people in the insignia of
their coat of arms. These honored fathers, gradually adopted
the custom of affixing this to all papers and documents until
Iy degrees it became an absolute necessity and finally ani-
versally, adopted. Thus the love of fame and distinction,on
the part of our ancestorshas developed into what in law is
required,the absence of which invalidates many instruments.
But while history tells us of these old customs,and that
what we call a trade mark of to-daywas in reality present in
early times in such forms as figures,signspictiresetc.,there
is no trace of any law which would give one party any right
to claim a devise or figure as his property and obtain pro-
tection for any cotnterfeiting on the part of his friendsun-
til comparitively recent times. The first case where such
contr~versy was brought into courtwas in 1742,when Lord Hard-
wicke refused to enjoin the defendant from using the plain-
tiffIs Great Mogul stanp on cards and said , rvery particu-
lar trader has ome particular mark or st%- - p,but I do not
know of any instance of granting an injunction he-±oe to res-
train one trader from uSing the mark with another. I think
it would be of mischievous consequence to do it. t?
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Since Lord Hardwicke's time the courts of JImgland and
Aneri ca, aided by the legislaturcs of the two countrieshave
established an almost complete system of trade mark law ascer
taining and defining the essential characteristicsthe rights
of traders thereinand the jurisdiction for their protection.
A trade mark may be defined a symbol,devise,word or
markadopted and exclusively used by a maker or vendor of
goods or other articlesto distinguish them from goods or
articles of the sane kind,made or sold by others.
Such mark need not be appropriated by the manufacturer;
his assignee or any one coming into possession of the estab-
lislhment and carying on the same business,has the same right
as the party first adopting the mark. The text writers and
courts experienced considerable trouble in formulating a sat-
isfactory definition,insomuch as it is difficult to distin-
guish the various marks and signs used on the goods manufact-
ured,from the many characters used on a signboard,or placard,
and all those less pe marks of distinction which are
used in trade.
The French, who have given th~s,usubj ect the most thought
of any jurists in the world,experience the same trouble,but
as an attempt they have defined a trade mask to be,tAsin
0.@
serving to distinguish the products of a manufacturer or the
objects of cornmerce,and the law cannot enumerate the sign."
and thus leaving to judicial tribunals, constru-ction and do-
termination of all cases of conflict. This difficulty is ex-
perienced in every country of the globe-- the absolute inabil-
ity to designate a clear and concise definition,that can be
applied1 in all cases.
A mere trade mark is an intangible thing,incapable of
ownership apart from the. thing to which it is applied. It is
the exclusive right of vending articles so marked,which the
law protects. Incapable of ownershipit is incapable of pos-
session. When a person buys the right to manufacture and sell
an articleit is accompanied by the trade mark;y et buying the
right to use the trade mark will not pass the goods to which
it is attached.
What ma. be adopted as a Trade Mark.
It is not easy to determine from the adjudication,what
signs,symbols,rnarks or words,may constitute valid trade marks,
from the fact "that there is a class of cases when,although
there is no real tirade mark,an injunction wvill be allowed,
because n intentional assimilation of' the lreculiar form,
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wrappers,labelsmarks, etc., of another's goods,for the pur-
pose of stealing his custom is apparent1 and the courts have
not in every instance been careful to distinguish such cases
from those of genuine trade marks.
To be valid the trade mark must indicate origin and own-
ership. It may consist of the manufacturer's name,a figure,
Retter,monogramfancy nam.e,newly coined word,or other sign
which can distinguish the manufacturer's goods from another.
Sebastian says ,, The original donn of a trade matk,was
probably the representation of some animal or other natural
object or mathematical figure,as the 'hall mark' of the lion,
/
or leopard's head,the free Masons Compassesor the Qovern-
mental broadsword, Such a mark would be independent of lan-
guage and would serve to distinguish goods of a certain make,
even for the illiterate.,?
It has been questioned whether pictures or animalscon-
stitute a valid trade iark,but the weight of authority now is
that such signs or characters mar appropriate for the purpose
of a trade mark with the express intention of thus using
the character to distingu~ish his goods in the market,will be
protected. Figures,letters and signs used on articles,simply
for the purpose of designation are not used in this sense,but
Qthe mark must be such as will reduce to a certainty the confi-
dence of the buy.er.
A trade mark to be worth anyrthingnust be recognized by
the publicand must be associated with a particular person's
business. The peculiar significance is,the inward thought of
the purchaser as, \f-hen I see that mark,I know the goods are
manufactured b.y so and so,and can place dependence in them. "
Judge All.son,in the case of Tierguson vs. The Davol
Mfrills,2 Brewster 314, held, that an injunction could not be
maintained by plaintiffs against defendants for assimulating
h-r trade mark,from the fact that nowhere on or near the
trade mark was the manufacturer's name or anything to indi-
cate its origin or ownership by plaintiffs,and this in the
light of the fLct that the plaintiffs had manufactured these
silesias for thirty years and they had become known and calld
ed by the X silLsias. The learned judge further reasoning,
says ,, I~o name appearing on the mark,the complainants might
manufacture and place on sale,spurious ar inferior articles,
and flood the market ,starnped with what they call their trade
mark and the public would be wholy unable to ascertain who
had manufactured and sold the goods. Protection is given only
in consideration of the guarantee of the integrity of the
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manufacturer or merchant,certified by his trade mark." This
decision appears to be decidedly contrary to all prior ard
subsequent adjudications on the point. To consider the reason-
ing of the learned judge sound and logical would be to call
many of the various trade marks adopted by the manufacturers
all over the country, illegal and incapable of protection by
the courts. Such words as rxcelsior, Ivory, Cocainehave been
adjudged to be valid trade marksunaccompanied by% anNT rmranu-
facturer' s Signature.
In Falkingburgh vs. Lucy 35 Cal. 52,the Court said
. The owner of a trade mark would be protected in its exclu-
sive use but only so far as it serves t6 indicate its origin
ot ownership of the goods to which it is affixed,to the exclu-
sion of such symnbols,figures,and combinations of words,which
may be interblended with it,indicating the name,kind,or qtalit'yT
of the article.t, The plaintiff in this case claimed the en-
t:re label as their trade mark and asked to be protected in
the use of it as a whole. The Court said ormly so much of
their label as serves to i ndicAe that the% are the manufact-
urers or vendors of the washing powder, can be considered as
constituting the legitimate characteristics of a cornon la'
trade mark~'
All foreign matter to a trade mark,as the words yds,no ,,
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placed about the mark and any particLlar position of the
mark do not in themselvcs imply ownership.
The natural product of thc earth may' be protected by
a trade mark as in the case of the Congress and Enpire Spring
Co. vs. High Rock Congress Spring Co.,where the plaintiffs
were protected in using the name ,tCongresst" to designate
water put up in bottles taken from a certain spring and ob-
tained an injunction against defendants from using the
same name on their bottles to designate the waters thcrein
contained. Judge Folger in delivering the opinion of the
Court ,said : tTwo questions present themselves for consider-
ation. First, can the ovner of a particular product of nature
be protected in the exclusive use of a name belonging to it
alone and employed by him as his trade mark' in the sale
thereof. Second,does the nami,,or trade mark used in the case
before us by the plaintiffs,indicate the origin or place
of that product and is it one in the exclusive use of which
the plaintiffs coulc' be protected.,,t These questions were
answered in the affm v oa The court fiurther said "By the
application of capitalrbusiness sagacityand enterprise,this
spring and its products have become extensively known and
favorably received. When one wishes for' the medicinal water
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which he has used before,he inquiires for it by its specific
name and it is this n.me the trade mark of the plaintiff,
which is the short phrase between buyer and seller,which
indicates the wish to buy and the power to sell water from
that origin the place of that ovwnership. This phrase,this
deviceis the trade mark of the plaintiffs and is of value
to them as thus designating the verity of its origin."
Designation of occupation or trade cannot be appropri-
ated. As the ,,Divinity Bookstore"i tThe Universitu Art
Gallery", they are but advertisements of goods to be found
there. The name of the article to be protected cannot be
appropriated as a t-'ade mark. Geographical names have been
held to be valid trade marks as in the case of the Akron
Cement. The defendants living in Syracuse were enjoined from
using that nanie to designate their goods. There are many
other, things which could be designated as a trade mark but
as this article is not to contain a thorough and minute trea-
tise of what can be a tradc mark we will pass to
Vlhat is an infringement.
Brovm in his treatise of the lawv of trade marks sa~-s
,, To entitle a trader to relief against the illegal use of his
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trade mark it is not necessary that the imitation thereof,
should be so close as to deceive persons seeing the two
marks side by side. But the degree or resemblance must be
such that ordinary purchascrs proceeding with ordinary cau-
tion arc likely to be mislead." This is the principle under-
lying all decisions of the courts. The', look to the fact
whethere the assimilation is such that upon the first glance
by the ordinary purchaser he could not distingutish the goods.
The class of >-ersons accustomed to trading are comparitively
few who subject all articles bought to close scrutiny. Such
persons are not the ones referred to in the above definition.
Men arcconstantl~y introducing new articles of merchan-
diseeither for the household,the farm or the manufacturery.
They place their goods on the market after having engrossed
upon such goods their private commercial Bi-gnature. They
feel secure in their labors and await results. If the commod-
ity proves a success they arc surprised to bearn of an arti-
cle closely resembling their ovn either equal in value of of
inferior quality,bearing the same or similar mark of dis-
tinction,placed on sale for the purpose of comipt it ion. His
trade and income is seriously affected. It is a fraud upon
him and upon the public. For just such cases as this the law
against infringements is in force. As it was said before ,the
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law applicable to these cases is of recent origin,beginning
with the cases reportecd above. When a case -,resents facts
where the pirating partt- :las assi'ilated the exact trade
mark of the original owner the case is easy of settlement,
for here thesve is a clear intent to defraud both manufacturer
and public. Eut in cases where the degree of assimilation is
less distinguishable then a greater question ar,.ses over
which the courts find much difficulty in settling. It is not
enough to show that persons incapable of reading the lables
bearing the mark might be deceived by the resemblance. It
must be that the ordinary class would probably be deceived.
Witness the great agitation at present over the "Pigs in
Clover,, puzzle. So great and wonderful has been the sale of
this one article all over the United States that there no
less than nine actions against infringers for placing on sale
a similar article. This puzzle is so simple and the imitation
so slight that the above rule may be applied effectually.
The test of an infringement is whether the assimila-
tion is calculated to deceive purchasers. A person having es-
tablished the right to use a nare,sybol,letter form,figLlre
or device as a trade mark it is an infraction of the right
to print ,manufacture or put on market for sale, and sell or
use upon articles of merchandise of the ssxue kind upon which
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it is used by the proprietor any device or sxmbol,which by
its resemblance to the trade mark will be liable to deceive
the publicand it is not necessar:r that it should be a fac
simile,precise copy of the original trade mark or so close
an imitation that the twvo cannot be disting;ished except by,
an expert or by a critical examination by one familiar
with the genuine trade mark. It is not necessary to prove
that it has been copied in every particularsufficient to
showv that the rciresentations bear such a resemblance to
his as to mislead the public generally. The court rill not
interfere to protect a part-,in use of a trade mark which is
emp'loyed to deceive the public by false representations,con-
tained in it.
The appelation give-l to a new medicine or compound is
not a trade mark. There is the necessity of a specific name
for the preporation and no matter when or by rhom given it
becomes its subsequent name. An eminent physician applied
for an injunction to restrain a chemist from publishing 7nd
selling a quack medicine under the name of tSir James Clark's
Consumption Pills", but the court refuised to interfere because
it didl not apepear that Siv" James had sustainedl any pecuniarT
injury.
An eminent Judge has said'", The object and ipurp~ose of the
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law in protecting trade marks is two fold: first,to secur-e to
him who has been instrumental in bringing into market a su-
perior article o - i merchandise the fruit of his industry/ and
skill. Secomd,to protect the corrinjuntiy from imp osition and
i{urnish some guarantee that the article purchased is the
manufacture of one who has appropriated to his own use a cer-
tain n e,simnbol or dcvice,as a trade mark is genuine.
There has been some conflict among authorities as to
whether the name of a hotel can be protected as a trade marI
whether two hotels of the same name may be run in the same
city- or torn . It is manifest that there must be some law
to protect the landlord in his name * For the degree of inju-
ry done may be augmented by the traveling publiK unconscious
of the two names. The law is now universal that such name
may be protected as the case of Taylor vs. Carpenter will
show. Plaintiff hired a lot of land and erected upon it a
hotel which he conducted tinder the name of the ,What Cheer
House" . pending his term he bought anca64oitg lot and
put up a building thereon. He continued for some time to oc-
cupy both buildings as the ,That Cheer House,, removing his
sign to the new buila~g. In November he removed to the new
buildir~, Th en defendants' opehied the old house and called
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it the "Original What Cheer ITousec,,the word ,,Original" so
snall that it was likely to be overlooked. Held,the plain-
tiffs entitled to protection in the exclusiveness of the
name.,.
When the manufacturer places his name in connection with
other words on a salable article with a clear intention of
using that name as his trade markhe will be protected in
such rights by the court. Where the design of the pirating
party is to deceive the public b, putting on the market) goods
so near alike the true ovmners as to deceive ordinary cau-
tious people he will be restrained by injunction.from using
such mark. The case of the Di:on Crucible Co. vs. Guggen-
heim, decides this point. There the plaintiff had used the
name Dixon's Carburet of iron.to denote their stove polish,
put up in a cube like form. The defendants prepared a pack-
age identical in shape using the snme words as plaintiff but
in some respeccts a little dliferent type so that to place
them side bY side a little difference mayf be detected. The
court held a injunction sustainable..
A trader is sometimes prohibited from usin7; a trade mark
design~edeby himself when byj his ownm act or by operatior of
law the title to its use ma have been alienated from him.
A person after having sold out his business cannot set up a
new business and use his old trade nAme or mark or in any
way represent himself as carryrng on the same business as be-
fore.
A similated trade mark must be on -he same class of
goods to constitute an infringement for it is not the nane
or trade mark that iS to be protected apart from the goodsbut
the exclusive right to protect goods so marked. There is no
infringement if the person uses the same mark on stoves that
another uses on paint and it has been held that a trade mark
on rnbber boots may be used on leather boots. There is con-
siderable controversy over the question as to whether the
name of a newspaper may be protected from infringement. Clear-
ly this class of cases comes within the general rule. There is
the mmifest fraud on the public and the proprietor. A
glance at the myriads of periodicals bearin the same nam.
but published in different localities will raise a question
as to the right of a publisher to use a name with but slight
variation from one alr)eady before the public. A man arn pub-
lish the New York Herald in NeW Yorsk city and anoth er mayr
publish the NTewark Herald in Iiewark,but should the putblisher
in Newark come over in hew York and publish a paper called
the New York Herald, even though the heading,matrial,type,
1 r/.
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or contents were wholly differentthere would be an injunct-
ion grante to restrain from so publishing . J
in 7 Robrtson 343 say,!s ', Although a ne spape' prolrictor
may by:- appr-opriationand use acquire such a property in
the name of his paper as will be protected fromn piracy yet
the mere assimilation of the name byl another person unless it
was clearly calculated to deceive the public would not be
unlaw~ful,,. I cannot infer anything else from this o-inion
than that referred to above-- alowing a person in another
locality by the prefixing of another name to use the name for
his paperas nearly*r all papers appropriate the town or city
in which they arc publishled as part of the name. But in case
where the city or town is not appropriated a different quest-
tion arises as in the case of the periodicals "Judge" "Time "r
or ,Puck". It is evident that :§hould a paper called Judge
containing the same class of literature be published in
Chicago or San Francisco there would be an action agaist the
publish-er ;or infringement and maintai-vable.
nere is no infringement on the !art of a manufacturer
who publishes in connection with his articles a picture or
drawing of a machine) (if it be a machine) or working utensils
when already some other manufacturer has published the same
design. The reason for this is that the article sold is conmon
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property and incapable of exclusive protection bir this means.
A mere transformation of the words forrning a trade mark
is only a colorable difference and will be restrained by
injunction. In Pierce vs. Guittare the laintiffs goods
were known as "German Sweet Chocolate," and the defendant's
imitation was called "Sweet Germnan Chocolate". The Supreme
Court had no dif iculty in enjoining the defendant from using
the nmne and refused to consider whether the words used con.
stituted a trade mark or not for it is a fraud on a person
who has established a business for his goods and carries it
on under a given name or with a particular mark for some
other person to assume the same name or mark or the same with
a s.ight ateration in such a way as to induce persons to
deal with them on the belief that the, are dealing with the
person who has given a reputation to the name or mark. And so
in the whole line of cases the courts base their decisinns
upon a double question of protecting the person who has
appropriated the mark for his protection and thereby built
up a large trade and also of protecting the public from in-
ferior and spurious goods which are placed upon the market
with the intention of deceiving the less cauticus
The foregoing comqments upon the law of infrigeMents
which has been deduced from the general run of decisions
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can ir light of the character of this article only be a
hurri.d review of some of the many points involved in the
law. The subject of statutory regulation haa not entered
into the discussion as yet. From the fact that 'he law passed
byr Congress in the year 1370 by which all trade marks were -,o
be registered in the Patent Office at Washington with the
ne-me of the person by whom appropriated,regulating the pun-
nishment of pirating, and that sucbtrade mark be in force
for thirty years with leave to re-registe2, has all been
declared-unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United
States in the case of the United States vs Stebbins. The
Congress strove to save the meosure by, classing it among the
comnmercial acts and bringing it within the claase of the con-
I'
stitution giving Congress power to regulate coimnerce but
the decisions of the Supreme Court has forever settled that
matter by declaring the act unconstitutional. Many of
the states haLte in force statutes regulating the registra-
tion and protection of trade marks,but it is not necessary
here to refer to them.
A prominent author has made manifest his intense hatred
of a person who would infringe the rights of a fellow trades-
man by assimilating his trade mark in the following compre-
hensive language: ,, There is no kind of larceny more sneaking,
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snake like.and despicable than the attempt of one merchant to
steal another's trade by the assimulation of his trade mark,
trade narmeor dcvisein connection with which his trade with
the former had been huilt up and by which his goods or busi-
ness are advertised.
This same idea is everwhere manifest in the opinions
of Courts,text 72 iters and private persons. Some opinions go
so far as to aope that in no remote day there may be a
criminal prosecution to satisfy the ends of justice.
Equity Courts will not in general refuse an injunction
on account of dalay in seeking relief where the proof of in-
fringement is clear,even though the delay may be such as to
preclude the party from any right to all account for past
profits. Chancery protects trade marks upon the ground that a
party should not be permitted to sell his own goods as thre
goods of anotherbut the plaintiff must not be guilty of laches.
Any long delay on his part ,by which the defendant may
have established for himself a large trade and even gone so
far as to shut out plaintiff's goods entirely from the mar-
ket, hen an action by plaintiff would not be maintainable.
He must upon first discovering, signify his right to protect-
ion by instigating his suit for injunction, In some cases
a delay on his part seeking the injunction would enable the
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defendantAcomplete his object and then an injunction would
avail him nothing as in the case of the "Pigs in Clover" puz-
zle. A delay on thc part of the ovner of this puzzle for a
month would avail him nothing for the nature of the article
is such that its object is attained in that length of time.
There may be ,"n action begun by the comlainant either in
law or in equity7. If in law,the action is for damages; if in
equity for an injunction restraining defendant from using
the mark. The law remedy is sought either under the common
law or the statutes enacted by the several states. here
may be also a criminal indictment which can arise under two
heads: .he fraudulent imitation of the trade mark as a
forgery,or obtaining money- under false pretenses. But these
remedies are very seldom put into operation. A court of
equity will not interfere by injunction to restrlain the use
of a trade mark unless the legal title is clear. In case of
doi.bt the court will not interfere until the case has
been tried in a court of law upon the pleadings and proof.
This was decided in the case of Partridge vs. Menck,2 Sand
Chant. 622 . Mr. Justice McIean said in Coffee vs. Brienton
(same fport) that the rule is fully settled and is recog-
nized in nearly all the cases that,in suits for infringements
of trade marks an injunction is never to be granted in the
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first instance if the exclusive title of the plaintiff is
denied,uxiless the grounds upon which it is denied are main-
ly frivolous. When the title is disp utcd the course is to
let the motion for an injunction stand over until the plaint-
iff has established his legal right in an action at law.

